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Over the last 2 decades, the question of how sterilized interventions can affect the exchange rate has been the focus of a great deal of attention in both academic and policy-making circles. Central to this debate has been the observation that sterilized interventions do not alter the relative money supplies of countries and therefore should not have any obvious effect on the exchange rate. In the 1970s and early 1980s, it was thought that these interventions might affect the exchange rate through a "portfolio balance" channel. Subsequent empirical research has found this story to be highly implausible, however. ' An alternative possibility, suggested by Mussa (1981) , is that intervention may signal changes in future monetary policy. This explanation would say that central banks may signal a more contractionary future monetary policy by buying domestic currency in the foreign exchange market today. Therefore, the expectations of future tighter
The relationship between foreign exchange intervention and monetary policy underlies the question of whether sterilized interventions can affect the exchange rate. In this article, I examine this relationship using data on U.S. foreign exchange interventions from 1985 to 1990, recently made publicly available. I examine whether interventions could be viewed as "signaling" changes in future monetary policy variables. I also consider whether changes in monetary policy may induce interventions in an effort by central bankers to "lean against the wind" of exchange rate movements. Interestingly, I find evidence both that interventions help predict monetary policy variables and that monetary variables help predict interventions.
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1. For example, Rogoff (1984) , Lewis (1988) , and others as surveyed in Edison (1992) find no evidence of a portfolio balance channel. However, Dominguez and Frankel (1993) find some support for this channel under the assumptions that an international capital asset pricing model holds and that exchange rate expectations can be measured with survey data.
(Journal of Business, 1995, vol. 68 If intervention provides a signal of future monetary policy, then the intervention should indeed be followed by changes in monetary policy variables. Therefore, in this article, I ask whether interventions help predict changes in monetary policy by examining the relationship between intervention and monetary policy variables.3 Despite the obvious importance of this issue, its direct analysis has only recently been made possible by the release of actual intervention data to the public.
In Section I, I begin with an illustrative example of how intervention can affect the exchange rate through changing expectations of future monetary policy. I then test this relationship with Granger-causality tests of intervention on various U.S. monetary policy variables. These monetary policy variables include MI, monetary base, nonborrowed reserves, and the Federal Reserve (Fed) funds rate, as well as the differential between the Fed funds rate relative to some foreign interest rates. For many cases, there is a significant relationship between intervention and changes in monetary aggregates. However, innovations to intervention are generally correlated with changes in monetary aggregates only within a short 2-week period. Furthermore, the coefficients relating intervention to future monetary policy are often the wrong sign to be consistent with the signaling story.
I therefore ask in Section II whether intervention is instead a response to economic conditions as reflected in the monetary variables. In this case, all of the variables except monetary base appear to explain intervention. These basic results continue to hold when intervention is treated as a limited dependent variable. Again, however, these relationships are strongest within a 2-week period.
One reason why intervention and monetary policy may be correlated during the 2-week period is the way in which sterilized intervention takes place. Section III describes how the nature of the Federal Reserve operating procedures together with foreign exchange interven-2. For empirical studies discussing signaling, see Dominguez (1987) as well as other references in Edison (1992) . Signaling has been used as a reason against intervention at Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meetings (e.g., the minutes of FOMC meeting, August 22, 1989, in Federal Reserve Board 1989).
3. While I use actual intervention data, Kaminsky and Lewis (1993) use market observations of days when central banks were intervening to test whether market participants would have considered intervention to be a signal. We used these observations to estimate a regime-switching process for money supply. In a similar vein, Rosengren (1991, 1992) examine the relationship between market observations of intervention and discount rate changes by the Group of Three countries. tion can induce a lag between intervention and sterilization, particularly during 2-week intervals corresponding to required reserves accounting periods. When the Granger-causality tests are performed after lagging intervention by 1-2 weeks, there is no longer much evidence that intervention helps predict monetary aggregates.
In Section IV, I consider whether a correlation between intervention and monetary policy would help explain the exchange rate anyway. That is, the signaling story presumes that changes in the money supply in fact affect the exchange rate, while empirical studies have found little evidence that money supply changes are statistically related to the exchange rate.4
These findings mirror early empirical findings that money supply innovations induce a positive or insignificant effect on the interest rate.5 These findings have recently been criticized on the grounds that broad monetary aggregates typically used by the early studies contain a significant component that is not under the control of the Federal Reserve. Christiano and Eichenbaum (1991 , 1992a , 1992b argue that nonborrowed reserves provide a better measure of money supply innovations. By contrast, Bernanke and Blinder (1992) propose the Federal funds rates as a monetary policy indicator and find that this measure is a better predictor of real economic activity than any monetary aggregate.
This debate suggests a reexamination of the monetary policy shock and exchange rate relationship as well. Broader monetary aggregates may include money demand shocks that are inappropriate for evaluating the effects of money supply innovations on the exchange rate. Therefore, in this article, I ask whether nonborrowed reserves or Fed funds rates provide different implications than MI for this relationship. I address this question by estimating the impulse response functions of the deutsche mark (DM)/dollar and the yen/dollar exchange rates arising from these monetary shocks. Interestingly, I find that the monetary variables affect the exchange rates in the expected direction. These results provide new evidence as well as new questions about the relationship between exchange rates, monetary variables, and intervention. I conclude by noting the limitations of these results and pointing to some important directions for future research.
I. Does Intervention Help "Signal" Future Monetary Variables?
The "signaling hypothesis" states that interventions induce traders in the market to alter their expectations of future monetary policy. This 4. See, e.g., Meese and Rogoff (1983) . In contrast, Mark (1993) finds a significant relationship between money supplies and exchange rates over long horizons.
5. See, e.g., Mishkin (1981 Mishkin ( , 1982 
J=o where s is the log exchange rate, f is the log of "fundamentals," and 0 is a discount factor. In monetary models of the exchange rate, 0 = I/(l + (x), where ax is the semielasticity of money demand.6 More specifically, let ft be given by t = (mt,-m,* + v, For simplicity, I will assume that m* and v are exogenous and are mutually uncorrelated. In this case, it can be shown that the exchange rate solution is composed of two components. The first component depends on the expectations of future domestic money, m. The second component depends on current expectations of future values of m* and v.7 To focus on the role of monetary shocks, I will subsume the effects of v and m* by setting their values equal to zero so that ft = mt. This assumption implies that the effects of future expectations about these variables will be ignored. However, setting these variables equal to zero does not lose generality for studying the effects of intervention and domestic money on exchange rates since future expectations of v and m* are by assumption independent of m and n.
To correspond roughly with the empirical analysis above, I will treat the process of fundamentals as autoregressive in first differences:
where A is the backward difference operator, Pm is the autoregressive coefficient of fundamentals differences on their own lag, nt is foreign exchange intervention at time t, and i is a parameter relating intervention k periods in the past with a current change in money supply. The variable n is measured as purchases of domestic currency (sales of 6. See, e.g., Frenkel and Mussa (1980) and Mussa (1982 As equation (5) shows, current interventions affect the exchange rate according to how they alter the expectations of future money supplies and thereby the exchange rate. This effect depends upon the parameter I. Note that when P equals zero, then according to equation (3), intervention conveys no information about future money supply changes. In this case, the last term in equation (5) shows that intervention has no effect on the exchange rate. In contrast, when expected dollar purchases as measured by increases in n signal future reductions in monetary policy, then P is negative. In this case, current and expected future dollar purchases will lead to dollar appreciation today.
To consider a more concrete example, suppose that the lag between interventions of dollar purchases and changes in the money supply is 1 period, so that k = 1. In this case, the exchange rate solution is St = mt1 + bmAmt + I30m Bn t, (5') 8. This process treats intervention as a continuous process for simplicity. As will be seen below, there are many days in the data when no intervention occurs, however. Kaminsky and Lewis (1993) treat the occurrence of intervention as affecting the future money supply relative to its level in the absence of intervention.
where 5m-(1 -Opn) -Clearly, a current intervention n, will affect the exchange rate in the direction implied by the signaling story as long as P < 0. In this case, an increase in current dollar purchases will increase the expected money supplies next period and thereby the exchange rate through the discount rate of money on the exchange rate, 0. The present value of this effect on all future expected intervention levels, and therefore money supplies, is measured by the product of the discount factors of money, 5m' and of intervention, An. If the lag between intervention and money supply changes, k, is longer than 1 period, then the example becomes more complicated but these basic features remain. The longer is k, the farther in the future current interventions are expected to affect the money supply and, therefore, the less impact interventions will have on the exchange rate today. In order to combine intervention and monetary aggregates at different frequencies, several intervention series were formed. First, since MI is measured from Monday to Monday, the daily intervention series were cumulated over the same period. These data together with Monday Fed funds rates were used as the weekly frequency data series. Second, since monetary base and nonborrowed reserves are measured Wednesday to the second following Wednesday, a second intervention series was cumulated over the same period. These data were used as the biweekly frequency data series."
B. Interventions and Monetary Policy
The maximum lag length of these VARs was first tested with a Wald test of zero restrictions at each lag. As reported in Appendix table B 1 these lag lengths were quite short. Except for the monetary base, the maximum lag length of these VARs were 2 weeks or less.
Panel A of table 1 reports the results of Granger-causality tests of intervention on the monetary policy variables.11 Interestingly, the hypothesis that intervention does not help predict monetary policy at the biweekly frequency is rejected at the 90% confidence level for three of the four monetary measures. Furthermore, intervention is significantly related to the Fed funds rate at the weekly frequency.
For the signaling story to be right, the coefficient on lagged intervention should indicate that dollar purchases are correlated with contractionary monetary policy. When monetary policy is measured by monetary aggregates, the coefficient on lagged intervention should be negative. When this policy is measured by Fed funds, dollar purchases should raise the interest rate, so that the lagged intervention coefficient should be positive.
9. Note that first-differencing the monetary aggregates in the VAR imposes the condition that intervention is a stationary variable.
10. MI and Fed funds were also used with this series. Experimentation with cumulating intervention with MI from Monday to the second Monday and using Wednesday Fed funds rates did not alter the basic conclusions below.
11. It should be noted that, while I use the standard terminology of "causality," the usual caveat applies here that correlation does not imply causality. NOTE.-Panel A reports marginal significance levels of the hypothesis that all lagged coefficients of intervention equal zero in a projection of the column variable on lagged own variables and intervention. Lag lengths were chosen by estimating a vector autoregression (VAR) with a maximum of 10 lags and forming a Wald statistic that all lags greater than or equal to k are zero, for k = 10, 9 .... The first lag that rejected this restriction was used as the lag length. The covariance matrix was corrected for conditional heteroscedasticity using Newey and West (1987) The theoretical example above illustrated that U.S. monetary policy relative to foreign monetary policy is the important variable for determining the exchange rate. Therefore, it may seem inappropriate to focus on U.S. monetary variables alone. Unfortunately, foreign money supply data are typically available only at a monthly frequency. Since the data sample is short, I cannot use monthly money supply data with much confidence. As an alternative I considered the interest differentials between the United States and two countries, Germany and Japan. The German and Japanese call money rates were used to correspond to an overnight interbank rate, as is the Fed funds rate. These variables were then used instead of the U.S. monetary policy variables above to, first, test the lag lengths and then to conduct Granger-causality tests. The lag-length tests are reported in Appendix table B2. As with the U.S. monetary policy variables, the lag lengths are quite short. Except for the differential between the Fed funds rate and the German rate, the lag lengths were all 2 weeks more or less.12 Panel A of table 2 reports the results of Granger-causality tests of 12. The Fed funds/German rate appeared to be somewhat sensitive to the day of the week that the variables were sampled. When the series were sampled on Wednesdays instead of Mondays, the lag length was 1 week. The longer lag structure is used in the estimation results below in order to provide more conservative estimates. intervention on these interest differentials. However, the hypothesis that intervention provides no information concerning future interest differentials cannot be rejected in any case.
Panals B and C report the coefficients on lagged intervention in these VARs to see if they indicate any pattern between lagged intervention and future monetary policy. However, the signs are mixed, and most of the coefficient estimates are insignificantly different from zero. As this discussion suggests, intervention and monetary policy may be related by a "leaning against the wind" policy in which monetary NOTE.-Panel A reports marginal significance levels of the hypothesis that all lagged coefficients of intervention equal zero in a projection of the column variable on lagged own variables and intervention. Lag lengths were chosen by estimating a vector autoregression (VAR) with a maximum of 10 lags and forming a Wald statistic that all lags greater than or equal to k are zero, for k = 10, 9, .... The first lag that rejected this restriction was used as the lag length. The covariance matrix was corrected for conditional heteroscedasticity using Newey and West (1987 NOTE.-The table reports marginal significance levels of the hypothesis that all coefficients on lags of the column variable equal zero in a projection of intervention on lagged intervention and lags of the column variable. Lag lengths were chosen by estimating a vector autoregression (VAR) with a maximum of 10 lags and forming a Wald statistic that all lags greater than or equal to k are zero, for k = 10, 9, ....
The first lag that rejected this restriction was used as the lag length. The covariance matrix was corrected for conditional heteroscedasticity using Newey and West (1987). These tests are reported in Appendix table B2. The column variables are FF = Fed funds rate, Rlpn is the Japanese call money rate, and RGer is the German call money rate. to be useful for predicting intervention at longer horizons of 2 weeks, while interest differentials are useful for predicting intervention at intervals less than a week.
B. Treating Intervention as a Limited Dependent Variable
The analysis above treated intervention as a continuous random variable since it can take any value on the real line. However, there were many days in which no intervention occurred, so that much of the distribution of intervention observations is concentrated at zero. The errors from regressions of intervention on other variables may therefore be far from normally distributed in small samples. For this reason, I also treat intervention as a limited dependent variable that is a function of lagged monetary policy variables.
Intervention was classified into three cases defined as follows: Thus, the relationship between go, co, and zero indicates the probabilities of each intervention type when the monetary aggregate does not change. Table 5 reports the results of estimating the logistic probabilities for each monetary aggregate examined in tables 1 and 3. As column 1 shows, movements in Ml are significant explanatory variables for the probability of intervention. Interestingly, both cl and g, are negative, as predicted by the "leaning against the wind" explanation. However, cl -91 > 0, so that the increase in M(i) increases the probability of a dollar sale intervention relative to no intervention. The first lag of monetary base also suggests "leaning against the wind" behavior. Both cl and g, are significantly negative. Furthermore, in this case, cl -g, is also negative, consistent with the view that increases in the monetary base reduce the probability of dollar sales interventions relative to no intervention. However, the second lags do not appear to affect significantly the likelihood of intervention.
Despite the significant effects of MI and monetary base, neither nonborrowed reserves nor Fed funds appear to affect the probability of intervention. This pattern reverses the finding in 
III. Is the Operating System Responsible?
A feature of the relationship between intervention and monetary aggregates found above is that the maximum lags in the vector autoregressions are typically 2 weeks. Of course, while an autoregressive process implies that shocks today persist indefinitely, moving average processes with innovations that disappear at fixed lags can look much like autoregressive processes. Thus, the relationships found above suggest a possible alternative explanation for the apparent correlation between monetary variables and intervention.
To understand this explanation, it is necessary to examine the operating system of the Federal Reserve together with intervention operations. The domestic monetary policy is based on a borrowed reserves targeting procedure. Under this procedure, the FOMC selects a level of borrowed reserves to be used as an operating target, based on an assumed relationship between the Fed funds rate and borrowed reserves. On a day-to-day basis, open market operations are primarily guided by an interim target for nonborrowed reserves based on an estimated demand for total reserves (subtracting out the borrowed reserves component). The nonborrowed reserves target is changed on a daily basis as revised estimates of required reserves are received and, less frequently, as excess reserve estimates are reviewed."3 Foreign exchange intervention affects the supply of nonborrowed reserves when the Federal Reserve receives payment by debiting the reserve account of a purchasers' depository institution. However, this intervention does not affect nonborrowed reserves targets. 14 Depending on the elasticity of short-term reserves demand, the institution of the purchaser of foreign exchange can either allow its dollar reserve level to fall temporarily or else try to increase the reserve level to its former level. If the banking system as a whole is willing to allow reserves to fall in the short run, then the intervention may not be effectively sterilized immediately. However, given the biweekly accounting for required reserves, the demand for reserves will likely return to its previous level over the 2-week period.
As a result of this complicated interaction of shocks to reserve supply induced by foreign exchange intervention and short-run demand for reserves, the effects of intervention on reserves may not be completely sterilized immediately. Rather, sterilization may occur only over time as the demand for reserves returns to its previous level.
If this story holds true, then the relationship between monetary aggregates and intervention during 2-week intervals may reflect in part the evolution of reserve demand. In this case, the correlations between monetary aggregates and intervention may have nothing to do with intentional signaling by the Federal Reserve.
As a simple check on this possibility, the vector autoregressions in tables 1 and 3 were repeated, after lagging intervention by 1 period. If 14. The Open Market Operations desk uses this information to update its forecasts of reserves on the settlement date. For most currencies, settlement takes place 2 days from agreeing to buy or sell foreign exchange. the relationships between intervention and money are due to the nature of the operating system, then lagging intervention will increase the likelihood that the sterilization process has been completed. Table 6 reports these results. As the table shows in panel A, the hypothesis that intervention does not Granger cause monetary variables cannot be rejected at the 95% confidence level for any variable except the Fed funds rate at a weekly frequency. Also, as reported in panel B, the hypothesis that monetary variables do not Granger cause intervention cannot be rejected for any of the monetary variables.
Although this evidence is only suggestive, it supports the notion that the correlation between intervention and monetary aggregates may arise from a timing lag in the sterilization process. The second monetary variable is motivated by the recent debate concerning the appropriate measure of monetary policy. Eichenbaum (1992a, 1992b) argue that early studies of the relationship between interest rates and money supplies were incorrect because they used MI and other broad measures of monetary aggregates. Both of these aggregates include borrowed reserves that are positively correlated with the Fed funds rate and other interest rates since increases in these rates induce banks to borrow more at the discount window. Although borrowed reserves are a very small component of MI and monetary base, they display considerable variability. As a result, MI is frequently found to be positively correlated with interest rates, while subtracting out borrowed reserves gives a negative relationship with interest rates. Christiano and Eichenbaum find that when nonborrowed reserves are used as monetary measures instead of MI or monetary base, then innovations to nonborrowed reserves imply negative responses of interest rates, as a liquidity channel would suggest.
If MI contains a significant component that varies positively with interest rates, then this variable may also be inappropriate for studies based on a monetary model of the exchange rate that depends on a liquidity effect."5 Therefore, it is interesting to ask whether nonborrowed reserves innovations will provide stronger evidence of a monetary channel than MI. Figure 2 shows the estimates of the impulse response functions together with the 95% confidence intervals for the DM/dollar rate. The top panel shows the effect of a 1% shock in MI. As would be predicted by a monetary model, the value of the dollar declines immediately and stays lower. However, the confidence intervals show that the depreciation in the dollar is significant only between 4 and 16 weeks after the shock. Nevertheless, the significant effect of the shock of Ml on the exchange rate is somewhat surprising given previous research on exchange rates.
The middle panel of figure 2 shows the effects when nonborrowed reserves are used as monetary indicators. Unlike the Ml measure, the nonborrowed reserves shock has no immediate impact on the exchange rate. But quite interestingly, the depreciating effects on the exchange rate become significant after 4 weeks and remain significant even after 20 weeks.
The last column shows the effects of a shock in the Fed funds rate. Like nonborrowed reserves, there is no immediate effect on the exchange rate. The point estimates imply that the rise in Fed funds induces an appreciation in the dollar after 2 weeks. However, these estimates are never statistically different from the 95% level (although they are at the 90% level).
While these estimates would suggest that monetary measures might explain the exchange rate as standard models predict, the response functions for the yen/dollar rate in figure 3 
C. Does the Exchange Rate Depend on Relative
Monetary Policies?
The focus of the previous analysis on U.S. monetary policy variables alone is an important shortcoming. As discussed above, monetary models would imply that exchange rates depend on relative money supplies. While the lack of high frequency money supply data preclude an investigation of money supply differentials over the short sample period, interest rate data can provide some information about the stance of foreign monetary policy. Therefore, I estimated trivariate vector autoregressions similar to those examined in figures 2 and 3, but including the German and Japanese call money rates. In particular, the system estimated was where r* is the logarithm of the German call money rate when the exchange rate is the DM/dollar rate and the Japanese call money rate when the exchange rate is the yen/dollar rate. Thus, the exchange rate was placed as last in the VAR order. These VARs were estimated, the impulse response functions calculated, and the Monte Carlo distributions generated as above. Figure 4 depicts the impulse response functions of the DM/dollar rate from shocks to U.S. monetary aggregates controlling for the German interest rates. Strikingly, the basic pattern found in figure 2 continues to emerge. A shock in MI is related to an immediate depreciation in the dollar. This decline is now statistically significant and continues for about 12 weeks. The nonborrowed reserves shock continues to imply a depreciation in the dollar even at 20 weeks. And finally, the Fed funds shock now becomes statistically significant after 6 weeks.
Figure 5 depicts these same impulse response functions for the yen/ dollar rate. As before, none of the impulse responses are significantly different from zero at the 95% level, although at the 90% level nonborrowed reserves are significant for some periods.
Overall, the evidence suggests that changes in monetary policy affect the exchange rate in the direction implied by standard monetary models. Except for MI, however, there is little evidence of a contemporaneous effect.
V. Concluding Remarks
This article has provided two new sets of empirical findings. First, it examined the relationship between foreign exchange intervention and U.S. monetary policy variables during the period from 1985 to 1990. The evidence suggests that there were significant correlations in both directions between the two variables. Second, the article analyzed the effects on exchange rates of innovations to different measures of monetary policy variables suggested by the recent debate on the domestic monetary transmission mechanism. Interestingly, positive innovations in nonborrowed reserves appear to be more systematically related to depreciation in the dollar exchange rates than MI. This finding is consistent with the Christiano-Eichenbaum view that MI contains a larger endogenous component relative to nonborrowed reserves.
Generally, this article has produced new empirical findings in the relationship between monetary variables, foreign exchange intervention, and exchange rates. A continuing challenge for international researchers is to provide theoretical explanations for these relationships. In addition, the evidence here leaves open several particular issues and questions.
First, the innovations in monetary policy variables did not control for real economic activity. The money supply decision presumably depends on variables such as the inflation rate and income growth. The short sample period of intervention precluded an analysis based on real variables measured monthly or quarterly. However, an issue for future research will be to reexamine the effect on the exchange rate using different measures of monetary policy controlling for real economic policy objectives.
Second, the analysis in this paper focused on the behavior of U.S. 
